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                                                                      PAGE   1
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113,  93 S.Ct. 705)
                          Jane ROE, et al., Appellants,
                                       v.
                                   Henry WADE.
                                   No. 70-18.
                              Argued Dec. 13, 1971.
                             Reargued Oct. 11, 1972.
                             Decided Jan. 22, 1973.
                         Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1973.
                        See 410 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1409.
  Action was brought for a declaratory and injunctive relief respecting Texas
 criminal abortion laws which were claimed to be unconstitutional. A three-judge
 United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, 314 F.Supp.
 1217, entered judgment declaring laws unconstitutional and an appeal was taken.
 The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Blackmun, held that the Texas criminal abortion
 statutes prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy except to save the
 life of the mother are unconstitutional; that prior to approximately the end of
 the first trimester the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
 the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician, subsequent to
 approximately the end of the first trimester the state may regulate abortion
 procedure in ways reasonably related to maternal health, and at the stage
 subsequent to viability the state may regulate and even proscribe abortion
 except where necessary in appropriate medical judgment for preservation of life
 or health of mother.
  Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
  Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart filed
 concurring opinions.
  Mr. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Rehnquist
 joined.
  Mr. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion.

 ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL
 K. Nature and elements of offenses.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Prior to approximately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy the
 attending physician in consultation with his patient is free to determine,
 without regulation by state, that in his medical judgment the patient's
 pregnancy should be terminated, and if that decision is reached such judgment
 may be effectuated by an abortion without interference by the state.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147

 ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL
 K. Nature and elements of offenses.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 From and after approximately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy a
 state may regulate abortion procedure to extent that the regulation reasonably
 relates to preservation and protection of maternal health. Id.
 Roe v. Wade

  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE2
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113,  93 S.Ct. 705)
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147

 ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL
 K. Nature and elements of offenses.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 If state is interested in protecting fetal life after viability it may go so
 far as to proscribe abortion during that period except when necessary to
 preserve the life or the health of the mother. Id.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147

 ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL
 K. Nature and elements of offenses.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 State criminal abortion laws like Texas statutes making it a crime to procure
 or attempt an abortion except an abortion on medical advice for purpose of
 saving life of the mother regardless of stage of pregnancy violate due process
 clause of Fourteenth Amendment protecting right to privacy against state
 action. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Vernon's Ann.Tex.P.C. arts. 1191-1194, 1196.
 Id.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147

 ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL
 K. Nature and elements of offenses.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 State in regulating abortion procedures may define "physician" as a physician
 currently licensed by State and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is
 not a physician as so defined. Id.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 13K6
 ACTION
 K. Moot, hypothetical or abstract questions.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Where pregnancy of plaintiff was a significant fact in litigation and the
 normal human gestation period was so short that pregnancy would come to term
 before usual appellate process was complete and pregnancy often came more than
 once to the same woman, fact of that pregnancy provided a classic justification
 for conclusion of nonmootness because of termination.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 92K42.1(3)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 K. Crime and punishment.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Childless married couple alleging that they had no desire to have children at
 the particular time because of medical advice that the wife should avoid
 pregnancy and for other highly personal reasons and asserting an inability to
 obtain a legal abortion in Texas were not, because of the highly speculative



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE3
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113,  93 S.Ct. 705)
 character of their position, appropriate plaintiffs in federal district court
 suit challenging validity of Texas criminal abortion statutes. Vernon's
 Ann.Tex.P.C. arts. 1191-1194, 1196.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 92K42.1(3)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 K. Crime and punishment.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 With respect to single, pregnant female who alleged that she was unable to
 obtain a legal abortion in Texas, when viewed as of the time of filing of case
 and for several months thereafter, she had standing to challenge
 constitutionality of Texas criminal abortion laws, even though record did not
 disclose that she was pregnant at time of district court hearing or when the
 opinion and judgment were filed, and she presented a justiciable controversy;
 the termination of her pregnancy did not render case moot. Vernon's
 Ann.Tex.P.C. arts. 1191-1194, 1196. Id.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 92K46(1)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 K. In general.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 With respect to single, pregnant female who alleged that she was unable to
 obtain a legal abortion in Texas, when viewed as of the time of filing of case
 and for several months thereafter, she had standing to challenge
 constitutionality of Texas criminal abortion laws, even though record did not
 disclose that she was pregnant at time of district court hearing or when the
 opinion and judgment were filed, and she presented a justiciable controversy;
 the termination of her pregnancy did not render case moot. Vernon's
 Ann.Tex.P.C. arts. 1191-1194, 1196.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 92K82
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 K. Constitutional guaranties in general.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy
 does exist under Constitution, and only personal rights that can be deemed
 fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty are included in this
 guarantee of personal privacy; the right has some extension to activities
 relating to marriage. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1, 4, 5, 9, 14, 14, s 1.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 92K82
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 K. Constitutional guaranties in general.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Constitutional right of privacy is broad enough to encompass woman's decision
 whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, but the woman's right to terminate



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE4
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113,  93 S.Ct. 705)
 pregnancy is not absolute since state may properly assert important interests
 in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards and in protecting
 potential life, and at some point in pregnancy these respective interests
 become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of factors that govern the
 abortion decision. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 9, 14. Id.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 92K82
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 K. Constitutional guaranties in general.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Where certain fundamental rights are involved, regulation limiting these rights
 may be justified only by a compelling state interest and the legislative
 enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only legitimate state interests at
 stake. Id.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 92K210(1)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 K. In general.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Word "person" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn.
 U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 92K252
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 K. Persons protected.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Word "person" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn.
 U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 92K258(3)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 K. Particular statutes and ordinances.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 State criminal abortion laws like Texas statutes making it a crime to procure
 or attempt an abortion except an abortion on medical advice for purpose of
 saving life of the mother regardless of stage of pregnancy violate due process
 clause of Fourteenth Amendment protecting right to privacy against state
 action. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Vernon's Ann.Tex.P.C. arts. 1191-1194, 1196.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 106K508(7)
 COURTS
 K. Criminal proceedings.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Absent harassment and bad faith, defendant in pending state criminal case
 cannot affirmatively challenge in federal court the statutes under which state



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE5
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113,  93 S.Ct. 705)
 is prosecuting him.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 170AK321
 FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
 K. Proceedings for intervention.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Application for leave to intervene making certain assertions relating to a
 class of people was insufficient to establish party's desire to intervene on
 behalf of class, where the complaint failed to set forth the essentials of
 class suit.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 170AK331
 FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
 K. In general.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Texas physician, against whom there were pending indictments charging him with
 violations of Texas abortion laws who made no allegation of any substantial and
 immediate threat to any federally protected right that could not be asserted in
 his defense against state prosecutions and who had not alleged any harassment
 or bad faith prosecution, did not have standing to intervene in suit seeking
 declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Texas abortion statutes which
 were claimed to be unconstitutional. Vernon's Ann.Tex.P.C. arts. 1191-1194,
 1196.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 170BK452
 FEDERAL COURTS
 K. Certiorari in general.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages
 of appellate or certiorari review and not simply at date action is initiated.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 170BK477
 FEDERAL COURTS
 K. Constitution or law of state contravening Constitution of United States.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Supreme Court was not foreclosed from review of both the injunctive and
 declaratory aspects of case attacking constitutionality of Texas criminal
 abortion statutes where case was properly before Supreme Court on direct appeal
 from decision of three-judge district court specifically denying injunctive
 relief and the arguments as to both aspects were necessarily identical. 28
 U.S.C.A. s 1253.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 170BK478
 FEDERAL COURTS
 K. Scope and extent of review.



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE6
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113,  93 S.Ct. 705)
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages
 of appellate or certiorari review and not simply at date action is initiated.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
 361K64(6)
 STATUTES
 K. Public offenses, prosecutions, and punishments.
 U.S.Tex. 1973.
 Conclusion that Texas criminal abortion statute proscribing all abortions
 except to save life of mother is unconstitutional meant that the abortion
 statutes as a unit must fall, and the exception could not be struck down
 separately for then the state would be left with statute proscribing all
 abortion procedures no matter how medically urgent the case. Vernon's
 Ann.Tex.P.C. arts. 1191-1194, 1196.
 Roe v. Wade
 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
  **707 *113 Syllabus[FN*]

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has
  been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
  reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,
  337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

  A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the
 constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe
 procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of
 saving the mother's life. A licensed physician (Hallford), who had two state
 abortion prosecutions pending against him, was permitted to intervene. A
 childless married couple (the Does), the wife not being pregnant, separately
 attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of
 contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment
 of the wife's health. A three-judge District Court, which consolidated the
 actions, held that Roe and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing
 to sue and presented justiciable controversies. Ruling that declaratory, though
 not injunctive, relief was warranted, the court declared the abortion statutes
 void as vague and overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth
 Amendment rights. The court ruled the Does' complaint not justiciable.
 Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and
 appellee cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of declaratory relief
 to Roe and Hallford. Held:
  1. While 28 U.S.C. s 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from the
 grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclose when the
 case is properly before the Court on appeal from specific denial of injunctive
 relief and the arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief are
 necessarily identical. Pp. 711-712.
  2. Roe has standing to sue; the Does and Hallford do not. Pp. 712-715.
  (a) Contrary to appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe's
 pregnancy did not moot her suit. Litigation involving pregnancy, which is
 'capable of repetition, yet evading review,' is an exception to the usual



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE7
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *113,  93 S.Ct. 705, **707)
 federal rule that an actual controversy *114 must exist at review stages and
 not simply when the action is initiated. Pp. 712-713.
  (b) The District Court correctly refused injunctive, but erred in granting
 declaratory, relief to Hallford, who alleged no federally protected right not
 assertable as a defense against the good-faith state prosecutions pending
 against him. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688. Pp.
 713-714.
  **708 (c) The Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or
 more of which may not occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or
 controversy. Pp. 714-715.
  3. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from
 criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard
 to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due
 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action
 the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her
 pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate
 interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality
 of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a 'compelling' point
 at various stages of the woman's approach to term. Pp. 726-732.
  (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
 abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
 the pregnant woman's attending physician. Pp. 731-732.
  (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester,
 the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
 chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
 maternal health. Pp. 731-732.
  (c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest
 in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
 proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
 for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Pp. 732-733.
  4. The State may define the term 'physician' to mean only a physician
 currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who
 is not a physician as so defined. Pp. 732-733.
  5. It is unnecessary to decide the injunctive relief issue since the Texas
 authorities will doubtless fully recognize the Court's ruling *115 that the
 Texas criminal abortion statutes are unconstitutional. P. 733.
  314 F.Supp. 1217, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
  Sarah R. Weddington, Austin, Tex., for appellants.
  Robert C. Flowers, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Texas, Austin, Tex., for appellee on
 reargument.
  Jay Floyd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for appellee on original argument.

  *116 Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

  This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
 179, 92 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201, present constitutional challenges to state
 criminal abortion legislation. The Texas statutes under attack here are typical
 of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a century.
 The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast and are a legislative
 product that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE8
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *116,  93 S.Ct. 705, **708)
 recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and
 of new thinking about an old issue.
  We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature
 of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among
 physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject
 inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges
 of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and
 family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to
 observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and
 conclusions about abortion.
  In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend
 **709 to complicate and not to simplify the problem.
  Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement,
 free of emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, because
 we do, we *117 have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis
 upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about
 man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in
 mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in
 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76, 25 S.Ct. 539, 547, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905):
'(The Constitution) is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and
 the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel,
 and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
 statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.'
 I
  The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the
 State's Penal Code,[FN1] Vernon's Ann.P.C. These make it a crime to 'procure an
 abortion,' as therein *118 defined, or to attempt one, except with respect
 to 'an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of
 saving the life of the mother.' Similar statutes are in existence in a majority
 of the States.[FN2]

FN1. 'Article 1191. Abortion
  'If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly
  procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall
  use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally
  applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the
  penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done
  without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By 'abortion' is
  meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the
  woman's womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.
  'Art. 1192. Furnishing the means
  'Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose
  intended is guilty as an accomplice.
  'Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion
  'If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender is
  nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, provided it be shown
  that such means were calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined
  not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.
  'Art. 1194. Murder in producing abortion
  'If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced or by



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE9
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *118,  93 S.Ct. 705, **709)
  an attempt to effect the same it is murder.'
  'Art. 1196. By medical advice
  'Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by
  medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.'
  The foregoing Articles, together with Art. 1195, compose Chapter 9 of Title
  15 of the Penal Code. Article 1195, not attacked here, reads:
  'Art. 1195. Destroying unborn child
  'Whoever shall during parturition of the mother destroy the vitality or
  life in a child in a state of being born and before actual birth, which
  child would otherwise have been born alive, shall be confined in the
  penitentiary for life or for not less than five years.'

FN2. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. s 13-211 (1956); Conn.Pub.Act No. 1 (May 1972
  special session) (in 4 Conn.Leg.Serv. 677 (1972)), and Conn.Gen.Stat.Rev.
  ss 53-29, 53-30 (1968) (or unborn child); Idaho Code s 18-601 (1948);
  Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, s 21-1 (1971); Ind.Code s 35-1-58-1 (1971); Iowa Code
  s 701.1 (1971); Ky.Rev.Stat. s 436.020 (1962); LaRev.Stat. s
  37:1285(6) (1964) (loss of medical license) (but see s 14-87 (Supp.1972)
  containing no exception for the life of the mother under the criminal
  statute); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 17, s 51 (1964); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., c.
  272, s 19 (1970) (using the term 'unlawfully,' construed to exclude an
  abortion to save the mother's life, Kudish v. Bd. of Registration, 356
  Mass. 98, 248 N.E.2d 264 (1969)); Mich.Comp.Laws s 750.14 (1948);
  Minn.Stat. s 617.18 (1971); Mo.Rev.Stat. s 559.100 (1969); Mont.Rev.Codes
  Ann. s 94-401 (1969); Neb.Rev.Stat. s 28-405 (1964); Nev.Rev.Stat. s
  200.220 (1967); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. s 585:13 (1955); N.J.Stat.Ann. s 2A:87-1
  (1969) ('without lawful justification'); N.D.Cent.Code ss 12-25-01, 12-25-
  02 (1960); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. s 2901.16 (1953); Okla.Stat.Ann., Tit. 21, s
  861 (1972-1973 Supp.); Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, ss 4718, 4719 (1963) (
  'unlawful'); R.I.Gen.Laws Ann. s 11-3-1 (1969); S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. s 22-17-
  1 (1967); Tenn.Code Ann. ss 39-301, 39-302 (1956); Utah Code Ann. ss 76-2-
  1, 76-2-2 (1953); Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 13, s 101 (1958); W.Va.Code Ann. s 61-
  2-8 (1966); Wis.Stat. s 940.04 (1969); Wyo.Stat.Ann. ss 6-77, 6-78 (1957).

  **710 *119 Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. Texas
 Laws 1854, c. 49, s 1, set forth in 3 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1502 (1898).
 This was soon modified into language that has remained substantially unchanged
 to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of 1857, c. 7, Arts. 531-536; G.
 Paschal, Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192-2197 (1866); Texas Rev.Stat., c. 8, Arts.
 536-541 (1879); Texas Rev.Crim.Stat., Arts. 1071-1076 (1911). The final article
 in each of these compilations provided the same exception, as does the present
 Article 1196, for an abortion by 'medical advice for the purpose of saving the
 life of the mother.'[FN3]

FN3. Long ago, a suggestion was made that the Texas statutes were
  unconstitutionally vague because of definitional deficiencies. The Texas
  Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of that suggestion peremptorily, saying
  only,
  'It is also insisted in the motion in arrest of judgment that the statute
  is unconstitutional and void, in that it does not sufficiently define or



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  10
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *119,  93 S.Ct. 705, **710)
  describe the offense of abortion. We do not concur with counsel in respect
  to this question.' Jackson v. State, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 79, 89, 115 S.W. 262,
  268 (1908).
  The same court recently has held again that the State's abortion statutes
  are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Thompson v. State, 493
  S.W.2d 913 (1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1200. The court held that 'the
  State of Texas has a compelling interest to protect fetal life'; that Art.
  1191 'is designed to protect fetal life'; that the Texas homicide statutes,
  particularly Act. 1205 of the Penal Code, are intended to protect a person
  'in existence by actual birth' and thereby implicitly recognize other human
  life that is not 'in existence by actual birth'; that the definition of
  human life is for the legislature and not the courts; that Art. 11196 'is
  more definite that the District of Columbia statute upheld in (United
  States v.) Vuitch' (402 U.S. 62, 91 S.Ct. 1294, 28 L.Ed.2d 601); and that
  the Texas statute 'is not vague and indefinite or overbroad.' A physician's
  abortion conviction was affirmed.
  In 493 S.W.2d, at 920 n. 2, the court observed that any issue as to the
  burden of proof under the exemption of Art. 1196 'is not before us.' But
  see Veevers v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 162, 168-169, 354 S.W.2d 161, 166-167
  (1962). Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 69-71, 91 S.Ct. 1294,
  1298-1299, 28 L.Ed.2d 601 (1971).

*120 II
  Jane Roe,[FN4] a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas,
 instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of
 the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion
 statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the
 defendant from enforcing the statutes.
  Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate
 her pregnancy by an abortion 'performed by a competent, licensed physician,
 under safe, clinical conditions'; that she was unable to get a 'legal' abortion
 in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation
 of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another
 jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She
 claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they
 abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth,
 Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe
 purported to sue 'on behalf of herself and all other women' similarly situated.

FN4. The name is a pseudonym.

  James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to
 intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been
 arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and
 *121 that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described
 conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that
 for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine **711 whether they
 fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He alleged
 that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of
 the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his patients'



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  11
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *121,  93 S.Ct. 705, **711)
 rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to
 practice medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth,
 Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
  John and Mary Doe,[FN5] a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that
 of Roe. They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like
 constitutional deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The
 Does alleged that they were a childless couple; that Mrs. Doe was suffering
 from a 'neural-chemical' disorder; that her physician had 'advised her to avoid
 pregnancy until such time as her condition has materially improved' (although a
 pregnancy at the present time would not present 'a serious risk' to her life);
 that, pursuant to medical advice, she had discontinued use of birth control
 pills; and that if she should become pregnant, she would want to terminate the
 pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under
 safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does
 purported to sue 'on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated.'

FN5. These names are pseudonyms.

  The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-
 judge district court. The suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant
 single woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant, *122 and the
 licensed practicing physician, all joining in the attack on the Texas criminal
 abortion statutes. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for
 dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her
 class, and Dr. Hallford, had standing to sue and presented justiciable
 controversies, but that the Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state
 a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that, with
 respect to the requests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was not
 warranted. On the merits, the District Court held that the 'fundamental right
 of single women and married persons to choose where to have children is
 protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment,' and that
 the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were
 both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the
 plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights. The court then held that abstention was
 warranted with respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore
 dismissed the Does' complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and
 dismissed the application for injunctive relief. 314 F.Supp. 1217, 1225
 (N.D.Tex.1970).
  The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
 s 1253, have appealed to this Court from that part of the District Court's
 judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney has purported
 to cross-appeal, pursuant to the same statute, from the court's grant of
 declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also have taken protective
 appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court
 ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision here. We postponed
 decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U.S. 941, 91 S.Ct.
 1610, 29 L.Ed. 108 (1971).
*123 III
  It might have been preferable if the defendant, pursuant to our Rule 20, had
 presented to us a petition for certiorari before judgment in the Court of



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  12
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *123,  93 S.Ct. 705, **711)
 Appeals with respect to the granting of the plaintiffs' prayer for declaratory
 relief. Our decisions in Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 90 S.Ct. 1763, 26
 L.Ed.2d 378 (1970), and Gunn v. University **712 Committee, 399 U.S. 383, 90
 S.Ct. 2013, 26 L.Ed.2d 684 (1970), are to the effect that s 1253 does not
 authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory
 relief alone. We conclude, nevertheless, that those decisions do not foreclose
 our review of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of a case of this
 kind when it is property here, as this one is, on appeal under s 1253 from
 specific denial of injunctive relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are
 necessarily identical. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct. 518,
 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362
 U.S. 73; 80-81, 80 S.Ct. 568, 573-574, 4 L.Ed.2d 568 (1960). It would be
 destructive of time and energy for all concerned were we to rule otherwise. Cf.
 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201.
IV
  We are next confronted with issues of justiciability, standing, and
 abstention. Have Roe and the Does established that 'personal stake in the
 outcome of the controversy,' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691,
 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), that insures that 'the dispute sought to be
 adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
 historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution,' Flast v. Cohen, 392
 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), and Sierra Club v.
 Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)? And what
 effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges against Dr. Hallford in
 state court have upon the propriety of the federal court's granting relief to
 him as a plaintiff-intervenor?
  *124 A. Jane Roe. Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is made
 that Roe is a fictitious person. For purposes of her case, we accept as true,
 and as established, her existence; her pregnant state, as of the inception of
 her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 of that year when she filed an
 alias affidavit with the District Court; and her inability to obtain a legal
 abortion in Texas.
  Viewing Roe's case as of the time of its filing and thereafter until as late
 as May, there can be little dispute that it then presented a case or
 controversy and that, wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a pregnant
 single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws, had standing to
 challenge those statutes. Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125 (CA2 1971);
 Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833, 8380-839 (CA6 1971); Poe v. Menghini,
 339 F.Supp. 986, 990-991 (D.C.Kan. 1972). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36
 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1951). Indeed, we do not read the appellee's brief as
 really asserting anything to the contrary. The 'logical nexus between the
 status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated,' Flast v. Cohen, 392
 U.S., at 102, 88 S.Ct., at 1953, and the necessary degree of contentiousness,
 Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969), are both
 present.
  The appellee notes, however, that the record does not disclose that Roe was
 pregnant at the time of the District Court hearing on May 22, 1970,[FN6] or on
 the following June 17 when the court's opinion and judgment were filed. And he
 suggests that Roe's case must now be moot because she and all other members of
 her class are no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy.



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  13
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *124,  93 S.Ct. 705, **712)

FN6. The appellee twice states in his brief that the hearing before the
  District Court was held on July 22, 1970. Brief for Appellee 13. The docket
  entries, App. 2, and the transcript, App. 76, reveal this to be an error.
  The July date appears to be the time of the reporter's transcription. See
  App. 77.

  *125 The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must
 exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date
 the action is initiated. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71
 S.Ct. 104, 95 **713 L.Ed. 36 (1950); Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC v.
 Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 92 S.Ct. 577, 30 L.Ed.2d 560
 (1972).
  But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the
 normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come
 to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination
 makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the
 trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should
 not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and
 in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us.
 Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It
 truly could be 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' Southern Pacific
 Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911).
 See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 1494, 23 L.Ed.2d 1
 (1969); Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
 178-179, 89 S.Ct. 347, 350, 351, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968); United States v. W. T.
 Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897-898, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953).
  We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to
 undertake this litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy, and
 that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her case moot.
  B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is different. He entered Roe's
 litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor, alleging in his complaint that he:
'(I)n the past has been arrested for violating the Texas Abortion Laws and at
 the present time stands charged by indictment with violating said laws in the
 Criminal District Court of Dallas County, Texas to-wit: (1) The State of Texas
 vs. *126 James H. Hallford, No. C-69-5307-IH, and (2) The State of Texas vs.
 James H. Hallford, No. C-69-2524-H. In both cases the defendant is charged with
 abortion . . .'
  In his application for leave to intervene, the doctor made like
 representations as to the abortion charges pending in the state court. These
 representations were also repeated in the affidavit he executed and filed in
 support of his motion for summary judgment.
  Dr. Hallford is, therefore, in the position of seeking, in a federal court,
 declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the same statutes under which
 he stands charged in criminal prosecutions simultaneously pending in state
 court. Although he stated that he has been arrested in the past for violating
 the State's abortion laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial and
 immediate threat to any federally protected right that cannot be asserted in
 his defense against the state prosecutions. Neither is there any allegation of
 harassment or bad-faith prosecution. In order to escape the rule articulated in



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  14
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *126,  93 S.Ct. 705, **713)
 the cases cited in the next paragraph of this opinion that, absent harassment
 and bad faith, a defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot
 affirmatively challenge in federal court the statutes under which the State is
 prosecuting him, Dr. Hallford seeks to distinguish his status as a present
 state defendant from his status as a 'potential future defendant' and to assert
 only the latter for standing purposes here.
  We see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in Samuels v. Mackell, 401
 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), compels the conclusion that the
 District Court erred when it granted declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford instead
 of refraining from so doing. The court, of course, was correct in refusing to
 grant injunctive relief to the doctor. The reasons supportive of that action,
 however, are those expressed in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, and in Younger v.
 *127 Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Boyle v.
 Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 91 S.Ct. 758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma,
 **714 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971); and Byrne v.
 Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 91 S.Ct. 777, 27 L.Ed.2d 792 (1971). See also
 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965). We
 note, in passing, that Younger and its companion cases were decided after the
 three-judge District Court decision in this case.
  Dr. Hallford's complaint in intervention, therefore, is to be dismissed.[FN7]
 He is remitted to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings against him.
 We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted Dr.
 Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in intervention.

FN7. We need not consider what different result, if any, would follow if
  Dr. Hallford's intervention were on behalf of a class. His complaint in
  intervention does not purport to assert a class suit and makes no reference
  to any class apart from an allegation that he 'and others similarly
  situated' must necessarily guess at the meaning of Art. 1196. His
  application for leave to intervene goes somewhat further, for it asserts
  that plaintiff Roe does not adequately protect the interest of the doctor
  'and the class of people who are physicians . . . (and) the class of people
  who are . . . patients . . ..' The leave application, however, is not the
  complaint. Despite the District Court's statement to the contrary, 314
  F.Supp., at 1225, we fail to perceive the essentials of a class suit in the
  Hallford complaint.

  C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe's standing in her case, the issue
 of the Does' standing in their case has little significance. The claims they
 assert are essentially the same as those of Roe, and they attack the same
 statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly note the Does' posture.
  Their pleadings present them as a childless married couple, the woman not
 being pregnant, who have no desire to have children at this time because of
 their having received medical advice that Mrs. Doe should avoid pregnancy, and
 for 'other highly personal reasons.' But they 'fear . . . they may face the
 prospect of becoming *128 parents.' And if pregnancy ensues, they 'would
 want to terminate' it by an abortion. They assert an inability to obtain an
 abortion legally in Texas and, consequently, the prospect of obtaining an
 illegal abortion there or of going outside Texas to some place where the
 procedure could be obtained legally and competently.



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  15
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *128,  93 S.Ct. 705, **714)
  We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have, as their asserted
 immediate and present injury, only an alleged 'detrimental effect upon (their)
 marital happiness' because they are forced to 'the choice of refraining from
 normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary Doe's health through a possible
 pregnancy.' Their claim is that sometime in the future Mrs. Doe might become
 pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive measures, and at that
 time in the future she might want an abortion that might then be illegal under
 the Texas statutes.
  This very phrasing of the Does' position reveals its speculative character.
 Their alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure, possible
 future pregnancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, and possible
 future impairment of health. Any one or more of these several possibilities may
 not take place and all may not combine. In the Does' estimation, these
 possibilities might have some real or imagined impact upon their marital
 happiness. But we are not prepared to say that the bare allegation of so
 indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual case or controversy.
 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S., at 41-42, 91 S.Ct., at 749; Golden v. Zwickler,
 394 U.S., at 109-110, 89 S.Ct., at 960; Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d, at 1124-
 1125; Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d, at 839. The Does' claim falls far
 short of those resolved otherwise in the cases that the Does urge upon us,
 namely, investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28
 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
 v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, **715 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); *129 and
 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). See
 also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915).
  The Does therefore are not appropriate plaintiffs in this litigation. Their
 complaint was properly dismissed by the District Court, and we affirm that
 dismissal.
 V
  The principal thrust of appellant's attack on the Texas statutes is that they
 improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to
 choose to terminate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the
 concept of personal 'liberty' embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
 Process Clause; or in personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be
 protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, see Griswold v. Connecticut,
 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
 U.S. 438 (1972); id., at 460, 92 S.Ct. 1029, at 1042, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (White,
 J., concurring in result); or among those rights reserved to the people by the
 Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 486, 85 S.Ct., at 1682
 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Before addressing this claim, we feel it desirable
 briefly to survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such
 insight as that history may afford us, and then to examine the state purposes
 and interests behind the criminal abortion laws.
VI
  It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion
 laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage.
 Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at any time during
 pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life, are not
 of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory
 changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century.



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  16
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *130,  93 S.Ct. 705, **715)
  *130 1. Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise determination.
 We are told that at the time of the Persian Empire abortifacients were known
 and that criminal abortions were severely punished.[FN8] We are also told,
 however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as well as in the Roman
 Era,[FN9] and that 'it was resorted to without scruple.'[FN10] The Ephesian,
 Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears
 to have been generally opposed to Rome's prevailing free-abortion practices. He
 found it necessary to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted to
 abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the procedure advisable.[FN11] Greek
 and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was
 prosecuted in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a
 violation of the father's right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar
 abortion.[FN12]

FN8. A Castiglioni, A. History of Medicine 84 (2d ed. 1947), E. Krumbhaar,
  translator and editor (hereinafter Castiglioni).

FN9. J. Ricci, The Genealogy of Gynaecology 52, 84, 113, 149 (2d ed.
  1950) (hereinafter Ricci); L. Lader, Abortion 75-77 (1966) (hereinafter
  Lader); K. Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States, in
  Abortion and the Law 37, 38-40 (D. Smith ed. 1967); G. Williams, The
  Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 148 (1957) (hereinafter Williams); J.
  Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in The Morality of Abortion 1,
  3-7 (J. Noonan ed. 1970) (hereinafter Noonan); Quay, Justifiable Abortion-
  Medical and Legal Foundations, (pt. 2), 49 Geo.L.J. 395, 406-422
  (1961) (hereinafter Quay).

FN10. L. Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath 10 (1943) (hereinafter
  Edelstein). But see Castiglioni 227.

FN11. Edelstein 12; Ricci 113-114, 118-119; Noonan 5.

FN12. Edelstein 13-14.

  2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous Oath that has stood so
 **716 long as the ethical guide of the medical profession and that bears the
 name of the great Greek (460(?)-377(?) B.C.), who has been described *131 as
 the Father of Medicine, the 'wisest and the greatest practitioner of his art,'
 and the 'most important and most complete medical personality of antiquity,'
 who dominated the medical schools of his time, and who typified the sum of the
 medical knowledge of the past?[FN13] The Oath varies somewhat according to the
 particular translation, but in any translation the content is clear: 'I will
 give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and
 in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion,'[FN14]
 or 'I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I
 make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an
 abortive remedy.'[FN15]

FN13. Castiglioni 148.




  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  17
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *131,  93 S.Ct. 705, **716)
FN14. Id., at 154.

FN15. Edelstein 3.

  Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the principal briefs in this case
 or in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201, it represents
 the apex of the development of strict ethical concepts in medicine, and its
 influence endures to this day. Why did not the authority of Hippocrates
 dissuade abortion practice in his time and that of Rome? The late Dr. Edelstein
 provides us with a theory:[FN16] The Oath was not uncontested even in
 Hippocrates' day; only the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon the
 related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand, commended
 abortion, at least prior to viability. See Plato, Republic, V, 461; Aristotle,
 Politics, VII, 1335b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of
 dogma. For them the embryo was animate from the moment of conception, and
 abortion meant destruction of a living being. The abortion clause of the Oath,
 therefore, 'echoes Pythagorean doctrines,' *132 and '(i)n no other stratum
 of Greek opinion were such views held or proposed in the same spirit of
 uncompromising austerity.'[FN17]

FN16. Id., at 12, 15-18.

FN17. Id., at 18; Lader 76.

  Dr. Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in a group representing
 only a small segment of Greek opinion and that it certainly was not accepted by
 all ancient physicians. He points out that medical writings down to Galen (A.D.
 130-200) 'give evidence of the violation of almost every one of its
 injunctions.'[FN18] But with the end of antiquity a decided change took place.
 Resistance against suicide and against abortion became common. The Oath came to
 be popular. The emerging teachings of Christianity were in agreement with the
 Phthagorean ethic. The Oath 'became the nucleus of all medical ethics' and 'was
 applauded as the embodiment of truth.' Thus, suggests Dr. Edelstein, it is 'a
 Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an absolute standard of medical
 conduct.'[FN19]

FN18. Edelstein 63.

FN19. Id., at 64.

  This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable explanation of the
 Hippocratic Oath's apparent rigidity. It enables us to understand, in
 historical context, a long-accepted and reversed statement of medical ethics.
  3. The common law. It is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed
 before 'quickening'-the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero,
 appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy[FN20]-was not an
 indictable offense.[FN21] The absence *133 of a **717 common-law crime for
 pre-quickening abortion appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier
 philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life
 begins. These disciplines variously approached the question in terms of the



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  18
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *133,  93 S.Ct. 705, **717)
 point at which the embryo or fetus became 'formed' or recognizably human, or in
 terms of when a 'person' came into being, that is, infused with a 'soul' or
 'animated.' A loose concensus evolved in early English law that these events
 occurred at some point between conception and live birth.[FN22] This was
 'mediate animation.' Although *134 Christian theology and the canon law came
 to fix the point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female, a
 view that persisted until the 19th century, there was otherwise little
 agreement about the precise time of formation or animation. There was
 agreement, however, that prior to this point the fetus was to be regarded as
 part of the mother, and its destruction, therefore, was not homicide. Due to
 continued uncertainty about the precise time when animation occurred, to the
 lack of any empirical basis for the 40-80-day view, and perhaps to Aquinas'
 definition of movement as one of the two first principles of life, Bracton
 focused upon quickening as the critical point. The significance of quickening
 was echoed by later common-law scholars and found its way into the received
 common law in this country.

FN20. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1261 (24th ed. 1965).

FN21. E. Coke, Institutes III *50; 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, c.
  31, s 16 (4th ed. 1762); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *129-130; M. Hale,
  Pleas of the Crown 433 (1st Amer. ed. 1847). For discussions of the role of
  the quickening concept in English common law, see Lader 78; Noonan 223-226;
  Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
  Foetus, 1664- 1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality (pt. 1), 14
  N.Y.L.F. 411, 418-428 (1968) (hereinafter Means I); Stern, Abortion: Reform
  and the Law, 59 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 84 (1968) (hereinafter Stern); Quay 430-
  432; Williams 152.

FN22. Early philosophers believed that the embryo or fetus did not become
  formed and begin to live until at least 40 days after conception for a
  male, and 80 to 90 days for a female. See, for example, Aristotle,
  Hist.Anim. 7.3.583b; Gen.Anim. 2.3.736, 2.5.741; Hippocrates, Lib. de
  Nat.Puer., No. 10. Aristotle's thinking derived from his three-stage theory
  of life: vegetable, animal, rational. The vegetable stage was reached at
  conception, the animal at 'animation,' and the rational soon after live
  birth. This theory, together with the 40/80 day view, came to be accepted
  by early Christian thinkers.
  The theological debate was reflected in the writings of St. Augustine, who
  made a distinction between embryo inanimatus, not yet endowed with a soul,
  and embryo animatus. He may have drawn upon Exodus 21:22. At one point,
  however, he expressed the view that human powers cannot determine the point
  during fetal development at which the critical change occurs. See
  Augustine, De Origine Animae 4.4 (Pub.Law 44.527). See also W. Reany, The
  Creation of the Human Soul, c. 2 and 83-86 (1932); Huser, The Crime of
  Abortion in Canon Law 15 (Catholic Univ. of America, Canon Law Studies No.
  162, Washington, D.C., 1942).
  Galen, in three treatises related to embryology, accepted the thinking of
  Aristotle and his followers. Quay 426-427. Later, Augustine on abortion was
  incorporated by Gratian into the Decretum, published about 1140. Decretum



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  19
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *134,  93 S.Ct. 705, **717)
  Magistri Gratiani 2.32.2.7 to 2.32.2.10, in 1 Corpus Juris Canonici 1122,
  1123 (A. Friedberg, 2d ed. 1879). This Decretal and the Decretals that
  followed were recognized as the definitive body of canon law until the new
  Code of 1917.
  For discussions of the canon-law treatment, see Means I, pp. 411-412;
  Noonan 20-26; Quay 426-430; see also J. Noonan, Contraception: A History of
  Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists 18-29 (1965).

  Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser
 crime, is still disputed. Bracton, writing early in the 13th century, thought
 it homicide.[FN23] But the later and predominant **718 view, following the
 great common-law scholars, has been that it was, at most, a lesser offense. In
 a frequently cited *135 passage, Coke took the position that abortion of a
 woman 'quick with childe' is 'a great misprision, and no murder.'[FN24]
 Blackstone followed, saying that while abortion after quickening had once been
 considered manslaughter (though not murder), 'modern law' took a less severe
 view.[FN25] A recent review of the common-law precedents argues, however, that
 those precedents contradict Coke and that even post-quickening abortion was
 never established as a common-law crime.[FN26] This is of some importance
 because while most American courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion
 of an unquickened fetus was not criminal under their received common law,[FN27]
 others followed Coke in stating that abortion *136 of a quick fetus was a
 'misprision,' a term they translated to mean 'misdemeanor.'[FN28] That their
 reliance on Coke on this aspect of the law was uncritical and, apparently in
 all the reported cases, dictum (due probably to the paucity of common-law
 prosecutions for post-quickening abortion), makes it now appear doubtful that
 abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to
 the destruction of a quick fetus.

FN23. Bracton took the position that abortion by blow or poison was
  homicide 'if the foetus be already formed and animated, and particularly if
  it be animated.' 2 H. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 279
  (T. Twiss ed. 1879), or, as a later translation puts it, 'if the foetus is
  already formed or quickened, especially if it is quickened,' 2 H. Bracton,
  On the Laws and Customs of England 341 (S. Thorne ed. 1968). See Quay 431;
  see also 2 Fleta 60-61 (Book 1, c. 23) (Selden Society ed. 1955).

FN24. E. Coke, Institutes III *50.

FN25. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *129-130.

FN26. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-
  Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative
  Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335
  (1971) (hereinafter Means II). The author examines the two principal
  precedents cited marginally by Coke, both contrary to his dictum, and
  traces the treatment of these and other cases by earlier commentators. He
  concludes that Coke, who himself participated as an advocate in an abortion
  case in 1601, may have intentionally misstated the law. The author even
  suggests a reason: Coke's strong feelings against abortion, coupled with



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  20
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *136,  93 S.Ct. 705, **718)
  his determination to assert common-law (secular) jurisdiction to assess
  penalties for an offense that traditionally had been an exclusively
  ecclesiastical or canon-law crime. See also Lader 78-79, who notes that
  some scholars doubt that the common law ever was applied to abortion; that
  the English ecclesiastical courts seem to have lost interest in the problem
  after 1527; and that the preamble to the English legislation of 1803, 43
  Geo. 3, c. 58, s 1, referred to in the text, infra, at 718, states that 'no
  adequate means have been hitherto provided for the prevention and
  punishment of such offenses.'

FN27. Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387, 388 (1812); Commonwealth v.
  Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Metc.) 263, 265-266 (1845); State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L.
  52, 58 (1849); Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 274, 278-280 (1856); Smith v.
  Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45, 51 (1857); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 210
  (1879); Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 532, 25 So. 144, 145 (1898); State v.
  Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 606, 64 P. 1014, 1016 (1901); Edwards v. State, 79
  Neb. 251, 252, 112 N.W. 611, 612 (1907); Gray v. State, 77 Tex.Cr.R. 221,
  224, 178 S.W. 337, 338 (1915); Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 169, 56
  S.E.2d 217, 221 (1949). Contra, Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633
  (1850); State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630, 632 (1880).

FN28. See Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 55 (1851); Evans v. People, 49 N.Y.
  86, 88 (1872); Lamb v. State, 67 Md. 524, 533, 10 A. 208 (1887).

  4. The English statutory law. England's first criminal abortion statute, Lord
 Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick
 fetus, s 1, a capital crime, but in s 2 it provided lesser penalties for the
 felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the 'quickening'
 distinction. This contrast was continued in the general revision of 1828, 9
 Geo. 4, c. 31, s 13. It disappeared, however, together with the death penalty,
 in 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 85, s 6, and did not reappear in the Offenses
 Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, s 59, that formed the
 core of English anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967. In
 1929, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, came into
 being. Its emphasis was upon the destruction of 'the life of **719 a child
 capable of being born alive.' It made a willful act performed with the
 necessary intent a felony. It contained a proviso that one was not to be
 *137 found guilty of the offense 'unless it is proved that the act which
 caused the death of the child was not done in good faith for the purpose only
 of preserving the life of the mother.'
  A seemingly notable development in the English law was the case of Rex v.
 Bourne, (1939) 1 K.B. 687. This case apparently answered in the affirmative the
 question whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant
 woman was excepted from the criminal penalties of the 1861 Act. In his
 instructions to the jury, Judge MacNaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and
 observed that that Act related to 'the case where a child is killed by a
 willful act at the time when it is being delivered in the ordinary course of
 nature.' Id., at 691. He concluded that the 1861 Act's use of the word
 'unlawfully,' imported the same meaning expressed by the specific proviso in
 the 1929 Act, even though there was no mention of preserving the mother's life



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  21
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *137,  93 S.Ct. 705, **719)
 in the 1861 Act. He then construed the phrase 'preserving the life of the
 mother' broadly, that is, 'in a reasonable sense,' to include a serious and
 permanent threat to the mother's health, and instructed the jury to acquit Dr.
 Bourne if it found he had acted in a good-faith belief that the abortion was
 necessary for this purpose. Id., at 693-694. The jury did acquit.
  Recently, Parliament enacted a new abortion law. This is the Abortion Act of
 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87. The Act permits a licensed physician to perform
 an abortion where two other licensed physicians agree (a) 'that the continuance
 of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of
 injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing
 children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated,' or (b)
 'that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer
 from such physical or mental abnormalities as *138 to be seriously
 handicapped.' The Act also provides that, in making this determination,
 'account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable
 environment.' It also permits a physician, without the concurrence of others,
 to terminate a pregnancy where he is of the good-faith opinion that the
 abortion 'is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave
 permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.'
  5. The American law. In this country, the law in effect in all but a few
 States until mid-19th century was the pre-existing English common law.
 Connecticut, the first State to enact abortion legislation, adopted in 1821
 that part of Lord Ellenborough's Act that related to a woman 'quick with
 child.'[FN29] The death penalty was not imposed. Abortion before quickening was
 made a crime in that State only in 1860.[FN30] In 1828, New York enacted
 legislation[FN31] that, in two respects, was to serve as a model for early
 anti-abortion statutes. First, while barring destruction of an unquickend fetus
 as well as a quick fetus, it made the former only a misdemeanor, but the latter
 second-degree manslaughter. Second, it incorporated a concept of therapeutic
 abortion by providing that an abortion was excused if it 'shall have been
 necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been advised by
 two physicians to be necessary for such purpose.' By 1840, when Texas had
 received the common law,[FN32] only eight American States *139 had
 **720 statutes dealing with abortion.[FN33] It was not until after the War
 Between the States that legislation began generally to replace the common law.
 Most of these initial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quickening
 but were lenient with it before quickening. Most punished attempts equally with
 completed abortions. While many statutes included the exception for an abortion
 thought by one or more physicians to be necessary to save the mother's life,
 that provision soon disappeared and the typical law required that the procedure
 actually be necessary for that purpose.

FN29. Conn.Stat., Tit. 20, s 14 (1821).

FN30. Conn.Pub.Acts, c. 71, s 1 (1860).

FN31. N.Y.Rev.Stat., pt. 4, c. 1, Tit. 2, Art. 1, s 9, p. 661, and Tit. 6,
  s 21, p. 694 (1829).

FN32. Act of Jan. 20, 1840, s 1, set forth in 2 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  22
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *139,  93 S.Ct. 705, **720)
  177-178 (1898); see Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 600, 153 S.W. 1124,
  1125 (1913).

FN33. The early statutes are discussed in Quay 435-438. See also Lader 85-
  88; Stern 85-86; and Means II 375-376.

  Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century the quickening distinction
 disappeared from the statutory law of most States and the degree of the offense
 and the penalties were increased. By the end of the 1950's a large majority of
 the jurisdictions banned abortion, however and whenever performed, unless done
 to save or preserve the life of the mother.[FN34] The exceptions, Alabama and
 the District of Columbia, permitted abortion to preserve the mother's health.
 [FN35] Three States permitted abortions that were not 'unlawfully' performed or
 that were not 'without lawful justification,' leaving interpretation of those
 standards to the courts.[FN36] In *140 the past several years, however, a
 trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by
 about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws, most of them patterned
 after the ALI Model Penal Code, s 230.3,[FN37] set forth as Appendix B to the
 opinion in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 754.

FN34. Criminal abortion statutes in effect in the States as of 1961,
  together with historical statutory development and important judicial
  interpretations of the state statutes, are cited and quoted in Quay 447-
  520. See Comment, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on
  Abortion: The Contradictions and the Problems, 1972 U.Ill.L.F. 177, 179,
  classifying the abortion statutes and listing 25 States as permitting
  abortion only if necessary to save or preserve the mother's life.

FN35. Ala.Code, Tit. 14, s 9 (1958); D.C.Code Ann. s 22-201 (1967).

FN36. Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., c. 272, s 19 (1970); N.J.Stat.Ann. s 2A:87-1
  (1969); Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, ss 4718, 4719 (1963).

FN37. Fourteen States have adopted some form of the ALI statute. See
  Ark.Stat.Ann. ss 41-303 to 41-310 (Supp.1971); Calif. Health & Safety Code
  ss 25950-25955.5 (Supp.1972); Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. ss 40-2-50 to 40-2-53
  (Cum.Supp.1967); Del.Code Ann., Tit. 24, ss 1790-1793 (Supp.1972); Florida
  Law of Apr. 13, 1972, c. 72-196, 1972 Fla.Sess.Law Serv., pp. 380-382;
  Ga.Code ss 26-1201 to 26-1203 (1972); Kan.Stat.Ann. s 21-3407 (Supp.1971);
  Md.Ann.Code, Art. 43, ss 137-139 (1971); Miss.Code Ann. s 2223 (Supp.1972);
  N.M.Stat.Ann. ss 40A-5-1 to 40A-5-3 (1972); N.C.Gen.Stat. s 14-45.1
  (Supp.1971); Ore.Rev.Stat. ss 435.405 to 435.495 (1971); S.C.Code Ann. ss
  16-82 to 16-89 (1962 and Supp.1971); Va.Code Ann. ss 18.1-62 to 18.1-62.3
  (Supp.1972). Mr. Justice Clark described some of these States as having
  'led the way.' Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional
  Appraisal, 2 Loyola U. (L.A.) L.Rev. 1, 11 (1969).
  By the end of 1970, four other States had repealed criminal penalties for
  abortions performed in early pregnancy by a licensed physician, subject to
  stated procedural and health requirements. Alaska Stat. s 11.15.060 (1970);
  Haw.Rev.Stat. s 453-16 (Supp.1971); N.Y.Penal Code s 125.05, subd. 3



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  23
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *140,  93 S.Ct. 705, **720)
  (Supp.1972-1973); Wash.Rev.Code ss 9.02.060 to 9.02.080 (Supp.1972). The
  precise status of criminal abortion laws in some States is made unclear by
  recent decisions in state and federal courts striking down existing state
  laws, in whole or in part.

  It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our
 Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion
 was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in
 effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right
 to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with
 respect to the early stage of pregnancy, **721 and very possibly without such
 a limitation, the opportunity *141 to make this choice was present in this
 country well into the 19th century. Even later, the law continued for some time
 to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy.
  6. The position of the American Medical Association. The anti-abortion mood
 prevalent in this country in the late 19th century was shared by the medical
 profession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have played a
 significant role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion legislation
 during that period.
  An AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was appointed in May 1857. It presented
 its report, 12 Trans. of the Am.Med.Assn. 73-78 (1859), to the Twelfth Annual
 Meeting. That report observed that the Committee had been appointed to
 investigate criminal abortion 'with a view to its general suppression.' It
 deplored abortion and its frequency and it listed three causes of 'this general
 demoralization':
'The first of these causes is a wide-spread popular ignorance of the true
 character of the crime-a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the foetus
 is not alive till after the period of quickening.
'The second of the agents alluded to is the fact that the profession
 themselves are frequently supposed careless of foetal life. . . .
'The third reason of the frightful extent of this crime is found in the grave
 defects of our laws, both common and statute, as regards the independent and
 actual existence of the child before birth, as a living being. These errors,
 which are sufficient in most instances to prevent conviction, are based, and
 only based, upon mistaken and exploded medical dogmas. With strange
 inconsistency, the law fully acknowledges the foetus in utero and its inherent
 rights, for civil purposes; while personally and as criminally affected, it
 fails to recognize it, *142 and to its life as yet denies all protection.'
 Id., at 75-76.
  The Committee then offered, and the Association adopted, resolutions
 protesting 'against such unwarrantable destruction of human life,' calling upon
 state legislatures to revise their abortion laws, and requesting the
 cooperation of state medical societies 'in pressing the subject.' Id., at 28,
 78.
  In 1871 a long and vivid report was submitted by the Committee on Criminal
 Abortion. It ended with the observation, 'We had to deal with human life. In a
 matter of less importance we could entertain no compromise. An honest judge on
 the bench would call things by their proper names. We could do no less.' 22
 Trans. of the Am.Med.Assn. 258 (1871). It proffered resolutions, adopted by the
 Association, id., at 38-39, recommending, among other things, that it 'be



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  24
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *142,  93 S.Ct. 705, **721)
 unlawful and unprofessional for any physician to induce abortion or premature
 labor, without the concurrent opinion of at least one respectable consulting
 physician, and then always with a view to the safety of the child-if that be
 possible,' and calling 'the attention of the clergy of all denominations to the
 perverted views of morality entertained by a large class of females-aye, and
 men also, on this important question.'
  Except for periodic condemnation of the criminal abortionist, no further
 formal AMA action took place until 1967. In that year, the Committee on Human
 Reproduction urged the adoption of a stated policy of opposition to induced
 abortion, except when there is 'documented medical evidence' of a threat to the
 health or life of the mother, or that the child 'may be born with
 incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency,' or that a pregnancy
 'resulting from legally established statutory or forcible rape or incest may
 constitute a threat to the mental or physical health of the *143 patient,'
 two other physicians 'chosen because of their recognized professional
 competency have examined the patient and have concurred in writing,'
 **722 and the procedure 'is performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint
 Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.' The providing of medical information
 by physicians to state legislatures in their consideration of legislation
 regarding therapeutic abortion was 'to be considered consistent with the
 principles of ethics of the American Medical Association.' This recommendation
 was adopted by the House of Delegates. Proceedings of the AMA House of
 Delegates 40-51 (June 1967).
  In 1970, after the introduction of a variety of proposed resolutions, and of a
 report from its Board of Trustees, a reference committee noted 'polarization of
 the medical profession on this controversial issue'; division among those who
 had testified; a difference of opinion among AMA councils and committees; 'the
 remarkable shift in testimony' in six months, felt to be influenced 'by the
 rapid changes in state laws and by the judicial decisions which tend to make
 abortion more freely available;' and a feeling 'that this trend will continue.'
 On June 25, 1970, the House of Delegates adopted preambles and most of the
 resolutions proposed by the reference committee. The preambles emphasized 'the
 best interests of the patient,' 'sound clinical judgment,' and 'informed
 patient consent,' in contrast to 'mere acquiescence to the patient's demand.'
 The resolutions asserted that abortion is a medical procedure that should be
 performed by a licensed physician in an accredited hospital only after
 consultation with two other physicians and in conformity with state law, and
 that no party to the procedure should be required to violate personally held
 moral principles.[FN38] Proceedings *144 of the AMA House of Delegates 220
 (June 1970). The AMA Judicial Council rendered a complementary opinion.[FN39]

FN38. 'Whereas, Abortion, like any other medical procedure, should not be
  performed when contrary to the best interests of the patient since good
  medical practice requires due consideration for the patient's welfare and
  not mere acquiescence to the patient's demand; and
  'Whereas, The standards of sound clinical judgment, which, together with
  informed patient consent should be determinative according to the merits of
  each individual case; therefore be it
  'RESOLVED, That abortion is a medical procedure and should be performed
  only by a duly licensed physician and surgeon in an accredited hospital



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  25
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *144,  93 S.Ct. 705, **722)
  acting only after consultation with two other physicians chosen because of
  their professional competency and in conformance with standards of good
  medical practice and the Medical Practice Act of his State; and be it
  further
  'RESOLVED, That no physician or other professional personnel shall be
  compelled to perform any act which violates his good medical judgment.
  Neither physician, hospital, nor hospital personnel shall be required to
  perform any act violative of personally-held moral principles. In these
  circumstances good medical practice requires only that the physician or
  other professional personnel withdraw from the case so long as the
  withdrawal is consistent with good medical practice.' Proceedings of the
  AMA House of Delegates 220 (June 1970).

FN39. 'The Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA do not prohibit a
  physician from performing an abortion that is performed in accordance with
  good medical practice and under circumstances that do not violate the laws
  of the community in which he practices.
  'In the matter of abortions, as of any other medical procedure, the
  Judicial Council becomes involved whenever there is alleged violation of
  the Principles of Medical Ethics as established by the House of Delegates.'

  7. The position of the American Public Health Association. In October 1970,
 the Executive Board of the APHA adopted Standards for Abortion Services. These
 were five in number:
'a. Rapid and simple abortion referral must be readily available through
 state and local public *145 health departments, medical societies, or other
 non-profit organizations.
'b. An important function of counseling should be to simplify and expedite
 the provision of abortion services; if should not delay the obtaining of these
 services.
**723 'c. Psychiatric consultation should not be mandatory. As in the case
 of other specialized medical services, psychiatric consultation should be
 sought for definite indications and not on a routine basis.
'd. A wide range of individuals from appropriately trained, sympathetic
 volunteers to highly skilled physicians may qualify as abortion counselors.
'e. Contraception and/or sterilization should be discussed with each abortion
 patient.' Recommended Standards for Abortion Services, 61 Am.J.Pub.Health 396
 (1971).
  Among factors pertinent to life and health risks associated with abortion were
 three that 'are recognized as important':
'a. the skill of the physician,
'b. the environment in which the abortion is performed, and above all
'c. The duration of pregnancy, as determined by uterine size and confirmed by
 menstrual history.' Id., at 397.
  It was said that 'a well-equipped hospital' offers more protection 'to cope
 with unforeseen difficulties than an office or clinic without such
 resources. . . . The factor of gestational age is of overriding importance.'
 Thus, it was recommended that abortions in the second trimester and early
 abortions in the presence of existing medical complications be performed in
 hospitals as inpatient procedures. For pregnancies in the first



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  26
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *146,  93 S.Ct. 705, **723)
 trimester, *146 abortion in the hospital with or without overnight stay 'is
 probably the safest practice.' An abortion in an extramural facility, however,
 is an acceptable alternative 'provided arrangements exist in advance to admit
 patients promptly if unforeseen complications develop.' Standards for an
 abortion facility were listed. It was said that at present abortions should be
 performed by physicians or osteopaths who are licensed to practice and who
 have 'adequate training.' Id., at 398.
  8. The position of the American Bar Association. At its meeting in February
 1972 the ABA House of Delegates approved, with 17 opposing votes, the Uniform
 Abortion Act that had been drafted and approved the preceding August by the
 Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 58 A.B.A.J. 380 (1972). We
 set forth the Act in full in the margin.[FN40] The *147 Conference
 **724 has appended an enlightening Prefatory Note.[FN41]

FN40. 'UNIFORM ABORTION ACT
  'Section 1. (Abortion Defined; When Authorized.)
  '(a) 'Abortion' means the termination of human pregnancy with an intention
  other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus.
  '(b) An abortion may be performed in this state only if it is performed:
  '(1) by a physician licensed to practice medicine (or osteopathy) in this
  state or by a physician practicing medicine (or osteopathy) in the employ
  of the government of the United States or of this state, (and the abortion
  is performed (in the physician's office or in a medical clinic, or) in a
  hospital approved by the (Department of Health) or operated by the United
  States, this state, or any department, agency, or political subdivision of
  either;) or by a female upon herself upon the advice of the physician; and
  '(2) within (20) weeks after the commencement of the pregnancy (or after
  (20) weeks only if the physician has reasonable cause to believe (i) there
  is a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would endanger the
  life of the mother or would gravely impair the physical or mental health of
  the mother, (ii) that the child would be born with grave physical or mental
  defect, or (iii) that the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or
  illicit intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 years).
  'Section 2. (Penalty.) Any person who performs or procures an abortion
  other than authorized by this Act is guilty of a (felony) and, upon
  conviction thereof, may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding ($1,000)
  or to imprisonment (in the state penitentiary) not exceeding (5 years), or
  both.
  'Section 3. (Uniformity of Interpretation.) This Act shall be construed to
  effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
  subject of this Act among those states which enact it.
  'Section 4. (Short Title.) This Act may be cited as the Uniform Abortion
  Act.
  'Section 5. (Severability.) If any provision of this Act or the application
  thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does
  not affect other provisions or applications of this Act which can be given
  effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the
  provision of this Act are severable.
  'Section 6. (Repeal.) The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:
  '(1)



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  27
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *147,  93 S.Ct. 705, **724)
  '(2)
  '(3)
  'Section 7. (Time of Taking Effect.) This Act shall take effect ___.'

FN41. 'This Act is based largely upon the New York abortion act following
  a review of the more recent laws on abortion in several states and upon
  recognition of a more liberal trend in laws on this subject. Recognition
  was given also to the several decisions in state and federal courts which
  show a further trend toward liberalization of abortion laws, especially
  during the first trimester of pregnancy.
  'Recognizing that a number of problems appeared in New York, a shorter time
  period for 'unlimited' abortions was advisable. The time period was
  bracketed to permit the various states to insert a figure more in keeping
  with the different conditions that might exist among the states. Likewise,
  the language limiting the place or places in which abortions may be
  performed was also bracketed to account for different conditions among the
  states. In addition, limitations on abortions after the initial 'unlimited'
  period were placed in brackets so that individual states may adopt all or
  any of these reasons, or place further restrictions upon abortions after
  the initial period.
  'This Act does not contain any provision relating to medical review
  committees or prohibitions against sanctions imposed upon medical personnel
  refusing to participate in abortions because of religious or other similar
  reasons, or the like. Such provisions, while related, do not directly
  pertain to when, where, or by whom abortions may be performed; however, the
  Act is not drafted to exclude such a provision by a state wishing to enact
  the same.'

  VII
  Three reasons have been advanced to explain historically the enactment of
 criminal abortion laws in the 19th century and to justify their continued
 existence.
  *148 It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a
 Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however,
 does not advance this justification in the present case, and it appears that no
 court or commentator has taken the argument seriously.[FN42] The appellants and
 amici contend, moreover, that this is not a proper state purpose at all and
 suggest that, if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad in protecting it
 since the law fails to distinguish between married and unwed mothers.

FN42. See, for example, YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F.Supp. 1048, 1074
  (D.C.N.J.1972); Abele v. Markle, 342 F.Supp. 800, 805-806
  (D.C.Conn.1972) (Newman, J., concurring in result), appeal docketed, No.
  72-56; Walsingham v. State, 250 So.2d 857, 863 (Ervin, J., concurring)
  (Fla. 1971); State v. Gedicke, 43 N.J.L. 86, 90 (1881); Means II 381-382.

  A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure. When most
 criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one
 for the woman.[FN43] This was particularly true prior to the
 *149 development of antisepsis. Antiseptic techniques, of course, were based



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  28
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *149,  93 S.Ct. 705, **724)
 on discoveries by Lister, Pasteur, and others first announced in 1867, but were
 not generally accepted and employed until about the turn of the century.
 Abortion mortality was high. Even after 1900, and perhaps until as late as the
 development of antibiotics in the 1940's, standard modern techniques such as
 dilation and curettage were not nearly so safe as they are today. Thus, it has
 been argued that a State's real concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was
 to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a
 procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy.

FN43. See C. Haagensen & W. Lloyd, A. Hundred Years of Medicine 19 (1943).

  **725 Modern medical techniques have altered this situation. Appellants and
 various amici refer to medical data indicating that abortion in early
 pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first trimester, although not
 without its risk, is now relatively safe. Mortality rates for women undergoing
 early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower
 than the rates for normal childbirth.[FN44] Consequently, any interest of the
 State in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure, except
 when it would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely
 disappeared. Of course, important state interests in the areas of health and
 medical standards do remain. *150 The State has a legitimate interest in
 seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed
 under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient. This interest
 obviously extends at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the
 facilities involved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate
 provision for any complication or emergency that might arise. The prevalence of
 high mortality rates at illegal 'abortion mills' strengthens, rather than
 weakens, the State's interest in regulating the conditions under which
 abortions are performed. Moreover, the risk to the woman increases as her
 pregnancy continues. Thus, the State retains a definite interest in protecting
 the woman's own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late stage
 of pregnancy,

FN44. Potts, Postconceptive Control of Fertility, 8 Int'l J. of G. & O.
  957, 967 (1970) (England and Wales); Abortion Mortality, 20 Morbidity and
  Mortality 208, 209 (June 12, 1971) (U.S. Dept. of HEW, Public Health
  Service) (New York City); Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abortions,
  1963-1968, 59 Studies in Family Planning 5, 7 (1970); Tietze, Mortality
  with Contraception and Induced Abortion, 45 Studies in Family Planning 6
  (1969) (Japan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary); Tietze & Lehfeldt, Legal Abortion
  in Eastern Europe, 175 J.A.M.A. 1149, 1152 (April 1961). Other sources are
  discussed in Lader 17-23.

  The third reason is the State's interest-some phrase it in terms of duty-in
 protecting prenatal life. Some of the argument for this justification rests on
 the theory that a new human life is present from the moment of conception.
 [FN45] The State's interest and general obligation to protect life then
 extends, it is argued, to prenatal life. Only when the life of the pregnant
 mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her,
 should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  29
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *150,  93 S.Ct. 705, **725)
 legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of
 the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to life
 birth. In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less
 rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may
 assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.

FN45. See Brief of Amicus National Right to Life Committee; R. Drinan, The
  Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, in Abortion and the Law 107 (D.
  Smith ed. 1967); Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due
  Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 233 (1969); Noonan 1.

  *151 Parties challenging state abortion laws have sharply disputed in some
 courts the contention that a purpose of these laws, when enacted, was to
 protect prenatal life.[FN46] Pointing to the absence of legislative history to
 support the contention, they claim that most state laws were designed solely to
 protect the woman. Because medical advances have lessened this concern, at
 least with respect to abortion in early pregnancy, they argue that with respect
 to such abortions the laws can no longer be justified by any state interest.
 There is some scholarly support for this view of original purpose.[FN47] The
 few state courts **726 called upon to interpret their laws in the late 19th
 and early 20th centuries did focus on the State's interest in protecting the
 woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus.[FN48] Proponents
 of this view point out that in many States, including Texas,[FN49] by statute
 or judicial interpretation, the pregnant woman herself could not be prosecuted
 for self-abortion or for cooperating in an abortion performed upon her by
 another.[FN50] They claim that adoption of the 'quickening' distinction through
 received common *152 law and state statutes tacitly recognizes the greater
 health hazards inherent in late abortion and impliedly repudiates the theory
 that life begins at conception.

FN46. See, e.g., Abele v. Markle, 342 F.Supp. 800 (D.C.Conn.1972), appeal
  docketed, No. 72-56.

FN47. See discussions in Means I and Means II.

FN48. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (1858).

FN49. Watson v. State, 9 Tex.App. 237, 244-245 (1880); Moore v. State, 37
  Tex.Cr.R. 552, 561, 40 S.W. 287, 290 (1897); Shaw v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R.
  337, 339, 165 S.W. 930, 931 (1914); Fondren v. State, 74 Tex.Cr.R. 552,
  557, 169 S.W. 411, 414 (1914); Gray v. State, 77 Tex.Cr.R. 221, 229, 178
  S.W. 337, 341 (1915). There is no immunity in Texas for the father who is
  not married to the mother. Hammett v. State, 84 Tex.Cr.R. 635, 209 S.W.
  661 (1919); Thompson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 913 (1971), appeal
  pending.

FN50. See Smith v. State, 33 Me., at 55; In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 450, 67
  A.2d 141, 144 (1949). A short discussion of the modern law on this issue is
  contained in the Comment to the ALI's Model Penal Code s 207.11, at 158 and
  nn. 35-37 (Tent.Draft No. 9, 1959).



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  30
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *152,  93 S.Ct. 705, **726)

  It is with these interests, and the weight to be attached to them, that this
 case is concerned.
  VIII
  The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line
 of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v.
 Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891), the
 Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
 certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In
 varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least
 the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
 557, 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth
 Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1872-1873, 20
 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350, 88 S.Ct. 507,
 510, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524,
 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct.
 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of
 the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 484-485, 85 S.Ct., at
 1681-1682; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486, 85 S.Ct. at 1682 (Goldberg, J.,
 concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of
 the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct.
 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). These decisions make it clear that only
 personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
 ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152,
 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They
 also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to
 marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d
 1010 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542, 62 S.Ct.
 1110, 1113-1114, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
 U.S., at 453-454, 92 S.Ct., at 1038-1039; id., at 460, 463- *153 465, 92
 S.Ct. at 1042, 1043-1044 (White, J., concurring in result); family
 relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442,
 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of
 Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, **727 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925),
 Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.
  This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
 concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it
 is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation
 of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
 whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would
 impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.
 Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
 involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
 distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
 physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
 concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
 bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise,
 to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and
 continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors
 the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  31
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *153,  93 S.Ct. 705, **727)
 consultation.
  On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that
 the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her
 pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone
 chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant's arguments that Texas either has
 no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest
 strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination,
 are unpersuasive. The *154 Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy
 also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is
 appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in
 safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting
 potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become
 sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the
 abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be
 absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici
 that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a
 close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the
 Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of
 this kind in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49
 L.Ed. 643 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 S.Ct. 584, 71
 L.Ed. 1000 (1927) (sterilization).
  We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the
 abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be
 considered against important state interests in regulation.
  We note that those federal and state courts that have recently considered
 abortion law challenges have reached the same conclusion. A majority, in
 addition to the District Court in the present case, have held state laws
 unconstitutional, at least in part, because of vagueness or because of
 overbreadth and abridgment of rights. Abele v. Markle, 342 F.Supp. 800
 (D.C.Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-56; Abele v. Markle, 351 F.Supp. 224
 (D.C.Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730; Doe v. Bolton, 319 F.Supp. 1048
 (N.D.Ga.1970), appeal decided today, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d
 201; Doe v. Scott, 321 F.Supp. 1385 (N.D.Ill.1971), appeal docketed, No. 70-
 105; Poe v. Menghini, 339 F.Supp. 986 (D.C.Kan.1972); YWCA v. Kugler, 342
 F.Supp. 1048 (D.C.N.J.1972); Babbitz v. McCann, *155 310 F.Supp. 293
 (E.D.Wis.1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 12, 27 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970);
 People v. Belous, 71 Cal.2d 954, 80 Cal.Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert.
 denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 920, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970); State v. Barquet, 262
 So.2d 431 (Fla.1972).
  Others have sustained state statutes. Crossen v. Attorney General, 344
 F **728 .Supp. 587 (E.D.Ky.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-256; Rosen v.
 Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F.Supp. 1217 (E.D.La.1970),
 appeal docketed, No. 70-42; Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F.Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C.1971),
 appeal docketed, No. 71-92; Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F.Supp. 741 (N.D.Ohio
 1970); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F.Supp. 189 (Utah 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-
 5666; Cheaney v. State, Ind., 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972); Spears v. State, 257 So.2d
 876 (Miss.1972); State v. Munson, S.D., 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), appeal docketed,
 No. 72-631.
  Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the
 right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  32
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *155,  93 S.Ct. 705, **728)
 decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some
 limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection of
 health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant. We agree with
 this approach.
  Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that
 regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
 interest,' Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627, 89 S.Ct.
 1886, 1890, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89
 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406,
 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and that legislative enactments
 must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 485, 85 S.Ct., at 1682; Aptheker v.
 Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1664, 12 L.Ed.2d 992
 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 904-905,
 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); see *156 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 460, 463-
 464, 92 S.Ct., at 1042, 1043-1044 (White, J., concurring in result).
  In the recent abortion cases, cited above, courts have recognized these
 principles. Those striking down state laws have generally scrutinized the
 State's interests in protecting health and potential life, and have concluded
 that neither interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for which a
 physician and his pregnant patient might decide that she should have an
 abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. Courts sustaining state laws have
 held that the State's determinations to protect health or prenatal life are
 dominant and constitutionally justifiable.
IX
  The District Court held that the appellee failed to meet his burden of
 demonstrating that the Texas statute's infringement upon Roe's rights was
 necessary to support a compelling state interest, and that, although the
 appellee presented 'several compelling justifications for state presence in the
 area of abortions,' the statutes outstripped these justifications and swept
 'far beyond any areas of compelling state interest.' 314 F.Supp., at 1222-1223.
 Appellant and appellee both contest that holding. Appellant, as has been
 indicated, claims an absolute right that bars any state imposition of criminal
 penalties in the area. Appellee argues that the State's determination to
 recognize and protect prenatal life from and after conception constitutes a
 compelling state interest. As noted above, we do not agree fully with either
 formulation.
  A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a 'person' within
 the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they
 outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If
 this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course,
 collapses, *157 for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed
 specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument.
 [FN51] On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument[FN52] that no
 case could be cited **729 that holds that a fetus is a person within the
 meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

FN51. Tr. of Oral Rearg. 20-21.

FN52. Tr. of Oral Rearg. 24.



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  33
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *157,  93 S.Ct. 705, **729)

  The Constitution does not define 'person' in so many words. Section 1 of the
 Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to 'person.' The first, in
 defining 'citizens,' speaks of 'persons born or naturalized in the United
 States.' The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal
 Protection Clause. 'Person' is used in other places in the Constitution: in the
 listing of qualifications for Representatives and Senators, Art, I, s 2, cl. 2,
 and s 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, s 2, cl. 3;[FN53] in the
 Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, s 9, cl. 1; in the Emoulument
 Clause, Art, I, s 9, cl. 8; in the Electros provisions, Art. II, s 1, cl. 2,
 and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the
 office of President, Art. II, s 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art.
 IV, s 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth,
 Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in ss 2 and 3 of the
 Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is
 such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any
 assurance, that it has any possible prenatal application.[FN54]

FN53. We are not aware that in the taking of any census under this clause,
  a fetus has ever been counted.

FN54. When Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment
  protection as a person, it faces a dilemma. Neither in Texas nor in any
  other State are all abortions prohibited. Despite broad proscription, an
  exception always exists. The exception contained in Art. 1196, for an
  abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving
  the life of the mother, is typical. But if the fetus is a person who is not
  to be deprived of life without due process of law, and if the mother's
  condition is the sole determinant, does not the Texas exception appear to
  be out of line with the Amendment's command?
  There are other inconsistencies between Fourteenth Amendment status and the
  typical abortion statute. It has already been pointed out, n. 49, supra,
  that in Texas the woman is not a principal or an accomplice with respect to
  an abortion upon her. If the fetus is a person, why is the woman not a
  principal or an accomplice? Further, the penalty for criminal abortion
  specified by Art. 1195 is significantly less than the maximum penalty for
  murder prescribed by Art. 1257 of the Texas Penal Code. If the fetus is a
  person, may the penalties be different?

  *158 All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the
 major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far
 freer than they are today, persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the
 Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.[FN55] This is in accord with
 the results reached in those few cases where the issue has been squarely
 presented. McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital, 340 F.Supp. 751 (W.D.Pa.1972);
 Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 335 N.Y.S.2d
 390, 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-434; Abele v. Markle, 351
 F.Supp. 224 (D.C.Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730. Cf. Cheaney v. State,
 Ind., 285 N.E.2d, at 270; Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68, 72 (CA7 1960), aff'd
 sub nom. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961);



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  34
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *158,  93 S.Ct. 705, **729)
 Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 619, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (1970);
 State v. Dickinson, 28 *159 Ohio St.2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971). Indeed,
 our decision in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 91 S.Ct. 1294, 28 L.Ed.2d
 601 (1971), inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would not have
 indulged in statutory interpretation favorable to abortion in specified
 circumstances if the necessary consequence was the **730 termination of life
 entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.

FN55. Cf. the Wisconsin abortion statute, defining 'unborn child' to mean
  'a human being from the time of conception until it is born alive,'
  Wis.Stat. s 940.04(6) (1969), and the new Connecticut statute, Pub. Act No.
  1 (May 1972 Special Session), declaring it to be the public policy of the
  State and the legislative intent 'to protect and preserve human life from
  the moment of conception.'

  This conclusion, however, does not of itself fully answer the contentions
 raised by Texas, and we pass on to other considerations.
  B. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo
 and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing
 young in the human uterus. See Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 478-
 479, 547 (24th ed. 1965). The situation therefore is inherently different from
 marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or
 procreation, or education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving,
 Skinner and Pierce and Meyer were respectively concerned. As we have intimated
 above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some
 point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of
 potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no
 longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured
 accordingly.
  Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at
 conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State
 has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. We
 need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained
 in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable
 to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of
 man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
  *160 It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of
 thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question. There has always been
 strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth. This was
 the belief of the Stoics.[FN56] It appears to be the predominant, though not
 the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith.[FN57] It may be taken to represent
 also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as
 that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on
 the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the
 conscience of the individual and her family.[FN58] As we have noted, the common
 law found greater significance in quickening. Physicians and their scientific
 colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus
 either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the
 fetus becomes 'viable,' that is, potentially able to live outside the mother's
 womb, albeit with artificial aid.[FN59] Viability is usually placed at about



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  35
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *160,  93 S.Ct. 705, **730)
 seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.[FN60] The
 Aristotelian theory of 'mediate animation,' that held sway throughout the
 Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman
 Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite opposition to this 'ensoulment'
 theory from those in the Church who would recognize the existence of life from
 *161 the moment of conception.[FN61] The latter is now, of course, the
 official belief of the Catholic Church. As one brief amicus discloses, this is
 a view strongly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians.
 Substantial **731 problems for precise definition of this view are posed,
 however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is
 a 'process' over time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such
 as menstrual extraction, the 'morning-after' pill, implantation of embryos,
 artificial insemination, and even artificial wombs.[FN62]

FN56. Edelstein 16.

FN57. Lader 97-99; D. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law 251-294 (1968).
  For a stricter view, see I. Jakobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, in
  Abortion and the Law 124 (D. Smith ed. 1967).

FN58. Amicus Brief for the American Ethical Union et al. For the position
  of the National Council of Churches and of other denominations, see Lader
  99-101.

FN59. L. Hellman & J. Pritchard, Williams Obstetrics 493 (14th ed. 1971);
  Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1689 (24th ed. 1965).

FN60. Hellman & Pritchard, supra, n. 59, at 493.

FN61. For discussions of the development of the Roman Catholic position,
  see D. Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality 409-447 (1970); Noonan
  1.

FN62. See Brodie, The New Biology and the Prenatal Child, 9 J.Family L.
  391, 397 (1970); Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15
  U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 273 (1968); Note, Criminal Law-abortion-The 'Morning-After
  Pill' and Other Pre-Implantation Birth-Control Methods and the Law, 46
  Ore.L.Rev. 211 (1967); G. Taylor, The Biological Time Bomb 32 (1968); A.
  Rosenfeld, The Second Genesis 138-139 (1969); Smith, Through a Test Tube
  Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 Mich.L.Rev. 127 (1968);
  Note, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1968 U.Ill.L.F. 203.

  In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse
 any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before life birth or to accord
 legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except
 when the rights are contingent upon life birth. For example, the traditional
 rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child
 was born alive.[FN63] That rule has been changed in almost every jurisdiction.
 In most States, recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was viable,
 or at least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few *162 courts



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  36
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *162,  93 S.Ct. 705, **731)
 have squarely so held.[FN64] In a recent development, generally opposed by the
 commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain
 an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. [FN65] Such an
 action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and
 is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the
 potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as
 acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of
 property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem.[FN66] Perfection of
 the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth.
 In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the
 whole sense.

FN63. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 33k-338 (4th ed. 1971); 2 F. Harper &
  F. James, The Law of Torts 1028-1031

FN63. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 335-338 (1949).

FN64. See cases cited in Prosser, supra, n. 63, at 336-338; Annotation,
  Action for Death of Unborn Child, 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967).

FN65. Prosser, supra, n. 63, at 338; Note, The Law and the Unborn Child:
  The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 Notre Dame Law. 349, 354-360
  (1971).

FN66. Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of
  Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 233, 235-238 (1969); Note, 56 Iowa L.Rev. 994, 999-
  1000 (1971); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child, 46 Notre Dame Law. 349,
  351-354 (1971).

X
  In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life,
 Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. We
 repeat, however, that the State does have an important and legitimate interest
 in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a
 resident of the State or a non-resident who seeks medical consultation and
 treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate
 interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are
 separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches
 *163 term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling.'
  With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of
 the mother, the 'compelling' point, in the light of present medical knowledge,
 is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the
 now-established medical **732 fact, referred to above at 725, that until the
 end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in
 normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may
 regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably
 relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of
 permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the
 qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the
 licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  37
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *163,  93 S.Ct. 705, **732)
 performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some
 other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility;
 and the like.
  This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to
 this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, in consultation with his
 patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his
 medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that
 decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of
 interference by the State.
  With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential
 life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
 presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.
 State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical
 and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal
 life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion *164 during
 that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
 mother.
  Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in
 restricting legal abortions to those 'procured or attempted by medical advice
 for the purpose of saving the life of the mother,' sweeps too broadly. The
 statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and
 those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, 'saving' the mother's
 life, the legal justification for the procedure. The statute, therefore, cannot
 survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.
  This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional
 challenge to the Texas statute asserted on grounds of vagueness. See United
 States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S., at 67-72, 91 S.Ct., at 1296-1299.
XI
  To summarize and to repeat:
  1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts
 from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without
 regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests
 involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
 abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
 the pregnant woman's attending physician.
  (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester,
 the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
 chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
 maternal health.
  (c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest
 in the potentiality of human life *165 may, if it chooses, regulate, and
 even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
 judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
  2. The State may define the term 'physician,' as it has been employed in the
 preceding paragraphs of this Part XI of this opinion, to mean only a physician
 currently licensed by the **733 State, and may proscribe any abortion by a
 person who is not a physician as so defined.
  In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201, procedural
 requirements contained in one of the modern abortion statutes are considered.



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  38
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *165,  93 S.Ct. 705, **733)
 That opinion and this one, of course, are to be read together.[FN67]

FN67. Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct.
  739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201, do we discuss the father's rights, if any exist in the
  constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No paternal right has
  been asserted in either of the cases, and the Texas and the Georgia
  statutes on their face take no cognizance of the father. We are aware that
  some statutes recognize the father under certain circumstances. North
  Carolina, for example, N.C.Gen.Stat. s 14-45.1 (Supp.1971), requires
  written permission for the abortion from the husband when the woman is a
  married minor, that is, when she is less than 18 years of age, 41 N.C.A.G.
  489 (1971); if the woman is an unmarried minor, written permission from the
  parents is required. We need not now decide whether provisions of this kind
  are constitutional.

  This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the
 respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and
 legal history, with the lenity of the common law, and with the demands of the
 profound problems of the present day. The decision leaves the State free to
 place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens,
 so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests.
 The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical
 treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where
 important *166 state interests provide compelling justifications for
 intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is
 inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it
 must rest with the physician. If an individual practitioner abuses the
 privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial
 and intra-professional, are available.
XII
  Our conclusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional means, of course, that the
 Texas abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall. The exception of Art. 1196
 cannot be struck down separately, for then the State would be left with a
 statute proscribing all abortion procedures no matter how medically urgent the
 case.
  Although the District Court granted appellant Roe declaratory relief, it
 stopped short of issuing an injunction against enforcement of the Texas
 statutes. The Court has recognized that different considerations enter into a
 federal court's decision as to declaratory relief, on the one hand, and
 injunctive relief, on the other. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S 241, 252-255, 88
 S.Ct. 391, 397-399, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965). We are not dealing with a statute that, on
 its face, appears to abridge free expression, an area of particular concern
 under Dombrowski and refined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S., at 50, 91 S.Ct.,
 at 753.
  We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in
 withholding injunctive relief, for we assume the Texas prosecutorial
 authorities will give full credence to this decision that the present criminal
 abortion statutes of that State are unconstitutional.
  The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor Hallford is reversed, and



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  39
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *166,  93 S.Ct. 705, **733)
 Dr. Hallford's complaint in intervention is dismissed. In all other respects,
 the judgment *167 of the District Court is affirmed. Costs are allowed to
 the appellee.
  It is so ordered.
  Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

  Mr. Justice STEWART, concurring.

  In 1963, this Court, in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10
 **734 L.Ed.2d 93, purported to sound the death knell for the doctrine of
 substantive due process, a doctrine under which many state laws had in the past
 been held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. As Mr. Justice Black's opinion
 for the Court in Skrupa put it: 'We have returned to the original
 constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and
 economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to
 pass laws.' Id., at 730, 83 S.Ct., at 1031.[FN1]

FN1. Only Mr. Justice Harlan failed to join the Court's opinion, 372 U.S.,
  at 733, 83 S.Ct., at 1032.

  Barely who years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct.
 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, the Court held a Connecticut birth control law
 unconstitutional. In view of what had been so recently said in Skrupa, the
 Court's opinion in Griswold understandably did its best to avoid reliance on
 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the ground for decision.
 Yet, the Connecticut law did not violate any provision of the Bill of Rights,
 nor any other specific provision of the Constitution.[FN2] So it was clear
 *168 to me then, and it is equally clear to me now, that the Griswold
 decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut
 statute substantively invaded the 'liberty' that is protected by the Due
 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[FN3] As so understood, Griswold
 stands as one in a long line of pre-Skrupa cases decided under the doctrine of
 substantive due process, and I now accept it as such.

FN2. There is no constitutional right of privacy, as such. '(The Fourth)
  Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental
  intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do
  with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal
  privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a
  person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
  people-is like the protection of his property and of his very life, left
  largely to the law of the individual States.' Katz v. United States, 389
  U.S. 347, 350-351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 510-511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (footnotes
  omitted).

FN3. This was also clear to Mr. Justice Black, 381 U.S., at 507,
  (dissenting opinion); to Mr. Justice Harlan, 381 U.S., at 499, 85 S.Ct., at
  1689 (opinion concurring in the judgment); and to Mr. Justice White, 381
  U.S., at 502, 85 S.Ct., at 1691 (opinion concurring in the judgment). See
  also Mr. Justice Harlan's thorough and thoughtful opinion dissenting from



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  40
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *168,  93 S.Ct. 705, **734)
  dismissal of the appeal in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522, 81 S.Ct. 1752,
  1765, 6 L.Ed.2d 989.

  'In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning
 of 'liberty' must be broad indeed.' Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
 572, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548. The Constitution nowhere mentions a
 specific right of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, but
 the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
 covers more than those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights. See
 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 755-
 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45
 S.Ct. 571, 573-574, 69 L.Ed. 1070; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400, 43
 S.Ct. 625, 626-627, 67 L.Ed. 1042. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-
 630, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-1329, 22 L.Ed.2d 600; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
 745, 757-758, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177-1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239; Carrington v. Rash, 380
 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 780, 13 L.Ed.2d 675; Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
 378 U.S. 500, 505, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1663, 12 L.Ed.2d 992; Kent v. Dulles, 357
 U.S. 116, 127, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 1118, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
 497, 499-500, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694-695, 98 L.Ed. 884; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10, 60 L.Ed. 131.
  *169 As Mr. Justice Harlan once wrote: '(T)he full scope of the liberty
 guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the
 precise **735 terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
 Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points priced out in
 terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion;
 the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and
 seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking,
 includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
 restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
 judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of
 the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.' Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
 497, 543, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1776, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (opinion dissenting from dismissal
 of appeal) (citations omitted). In the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 'Great
 concepts like . . . 'liberty' . . . were purposely left to gather meaning from
 experience. For they relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact,
 and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant
 society remains unchanged.' National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
 337 U.S. 582, 646, 69 S.Ct. 1173, 1195, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (dissenting opinion).
  Several decisions of this Court make clear that freedom of personal choice in
 matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
 Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010; Griswold v. Connecticut, supra;
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra. See also Prince
 v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645; Skinner
 v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655. As recently
 as last Term, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038,
 31 L.Ed.2d 349, we recognized 'the right of the individual, married or single,
 to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
 fundamentally affecting a person *170 as the decision whether to bear or
 beget a child.' That right necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  41
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *170,  93 S.Ct. 705, **735)
 whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 'Certainly the interests of a woman
 in giving of her physical and emotional self during pregnancy and the interests
 that will be affected throughout her life by the birth and raising of a child
 are of a far greater degree of significance and personal intimacy than the
 right to send a child to private school protected in Pierce v. Society of
 Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), or the right to
 teach a foreign language protected in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct.
 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).' Abele v. Markle, 351 F.Supp. 224, 227
 (D.C.Conn.1972).
  Clearly, therefore, the Court today is correct in holding that the right
 asserted by Jane Roe is embraced within the personal liberty protected by the
 Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  It is evident that the Texas abortion statute infringes that right directly.
 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgment of a
 constitutional freedom than that worked by the inflexible criminal statute now
 in force in Texas. The question then becomes whether the state interests
 advanced to justify this abridgment can survive the 'particularly careful
 scrutiny' that the Fourteenth Amendment here requires.
  The asserted state interests are protection of the health and safety of the
 pregnant woman, and protection of the potential future human life within her.
 These are legitimate objectives, amply sufficient to permit a State to regulate
 abortions as it does other surgical procedures, and perhaps sufficient to
 permit a State to regulate abortions more stringently or even to prohibit them
 in the late stages of pregnancy. But such legislation is not before us, and I
 think the Court today has thoroughly demonstrated that these state interests
 cannot constitutionally support the broad abridgment **736 of
 personal *171 liberty worked by the existing Texas law. Accordingly, I join
 the Court's opinion holding that that law is invalid under the Due Process
 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

  Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, dissenting.

  The Court's opinion brings to the decision of this troubling question both
 extensive historical fact and a wealth of legal scholarship. While the opinion
 thus commands my respect, I find myself nonetheless in fundamental disagreement
 with those parts of it that invalidate the Texas statute in question, and
 therefore dissent.
 I
  The Court's opinion decides that a State may impose virtually no restriction
 on the performance of abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy. Our
 previous decisions indicate that a necessary predicate for such an opinion is a
 plaintiff who was in her first trimester of pregnancy at some time during the
 pendency of her lawsuit. While a party may vindicate his own constitutional
 rights, he may not seek vindication for the rights of others. Moose Lodge No.
 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972); Sierra Club
 v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). The Court's
 statement of facts in this case makes clear, however, that the record in no way
 indicates the presence of such a plaintiff. We know only that plaintiff Roe at
 the time of filing her complaint was a pregnant woman; for aught that appears
 in this record, she may have been in her last trimester of pregnancy as of the



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  42
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *171,  93 S.Ct. 705, **736)
 date the complaint was filed.
  Nothing in the Court's opinion indicates that Texas might not constitutionally
 apply its proscription of abortion as written to a woman in that stage of
 pregnancy. Nonetheless, the Court uses her complaint against the Texas statute
 as a fulcrum for deciding that States may *172 impose virtually no
 restrictions on medical abortions performed during the first trimester of
 pregnancy. In deciding such a hypothetical lawsuit, the Court departs from the
 longstanding admonition that it should never 'formulate a rule of
 constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
 to be applied.' Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of
 Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 355, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1885). See also
 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482, 80 L.Ed. 688
 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
II
  Even if there were a plaintiff in this case capable of litigating the issue
 which the Court decides, I would reach a conclusion opposite to that reached by
 the Court. I have difficulty in concluding, as the Court does, that the right
 of 'privacy' is involved in this case. Texas, by the statute here challenged,
 bars the performance of a medical abortion by a licensed physician on a
 plaintiff such as Roe. A transaction resulting in an operation such as this is
 not 'private' in the ordinary usage of that word. Nor is the 'privacy' that the
 Court finds here even a distant relative of the freedom from searches and
 seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which the Court
 has referred to as embodying a right to privacy. Katz v. United States, 389
 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
  If the Court means by the term 'privacy' no more than that the claim of a
 person to be free from unwanted state regulation of consensual transactions may
 be a form of 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no doubt
 that similar claims have been upheld in our earlier decisions on the basis of
 that liberty. I agree with the statement of Mr. Justice STEWART in his
 concurring opinion that the 'liberty,' against deprivation of which without due
 process the Fourteenth *173 Amendment protects, embraces more than the
 rights found in the Bill of Rights. But that **737 liberty is not guaranteed
 absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without due process of
 law. The test traditionally applied in the area of social and economic
 legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational
 relation to a valid state objective. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
 483, 491, 75 S.Ct. 461, 466, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). The Due Process Clause of the
 Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly does place a limit, albeit a broad one, on
 legislative power to enact laws such as this. If the Texas statute were to
 prohibit an abortion even where the mother's life is in jeopardy, I have little
 doubt that such a statute would lack a rational relation to a valid state
 objective under the test stated in Williamson, supra. But the Court's sweeping
 invalidation of any restrictions on abortion during the first trimester is
 impossible to justify under that standard, and the conscious weighing of
 competing factors that the Court's opinion apparently substitutes for the
 established test is far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a
 judicial one.
  The Court eschews the history of the Fourteenth Amendment in its reliance on
 the 'compelling state interest' test. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  43
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *173,  93 S.Ct. 705, **737)
 406 U.S. 164, 179, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1408, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972) (dissenting
 opinion). But the Court adds a new wrinkle to this test by transposing it from
 the legal considerations associated with the Equal Protection Clause of the
 Fourteenth Amendment to this case arising under the Due Process Clause of the
 Fourteenth Amendment. Unless I misapprehend the consequences of this
 transplanting of the 'compelling state interest test,' the Court's opinion will
 accomplish the seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more
 confused than it found it.
  *174 While the Court's opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice
 Holmes in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74, 25 S.Ct. 539, 551, 49 L.Ed.
 937 (1905), the result it reaches is more closely attuned to the majority
 opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case. As in Lochner and similar cases
 applying substantive due process standards to economic and social welfare
 legislation, the adoption of the compelling state interest standard will
 inevitably require this Court to examine the legislative policies and pass on
 the wisdom of these policies in the very process of deciding whether a
 particular state interest put forward may or may not be 'compelling.' The
 decision here to break pregnancy into three distinct terms and to outline the
 permissible restrictions the State may impose in each one, for example,
 partakes more of judicial legislation than it does of a determination of the
 intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all the majority
 sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a
 century is a strong indication, it seems to me, that the asserted right to an
 abortion is not 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
 be ranked as fundamental,' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct.
 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). Even today, when society's views on abortion are
 changing, the very existence of the debate is evidence that the 'right' to an
 abortion is not so universally accepted as the appellant would have us believe.
  To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the Scope of
 the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently completely unknown to the
 drafters of the Amendment. As early as 1821, the first state law dealing
 directly with abortion was enacted by the Connecticut Legislature. Conn.Stat.,
 Tit. 22, ss 14, 16. By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth *175
 Amendment in 1868, there were at least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial
 legislatures limiting **738 abortion.[FN1] While many States have amended or
 updated *176 their laws, 21 of the laws on the books in 1868 remain in
 effect today.[FN2] Indeed, the Texas statute **739 struck down today was, as
 the majority notes, first enacted in 1857 *177 and 'has remained
 substantially unchanged to the present time.' Ante, at 710.

FN1. Jurisdictions having enacted abortion laws prior to the adoption of
  the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868:
  1. Alabama-Ala.Acts, c. 6, s 2 (1840).
  2. Arizona-Howell Code, c. 10, s 45 (1865).
  3. Arkansas-Ark.Rev.Stat., c. 44, div. III, Art. II, s 6 (1838).
  4. California-Cal.Sess.Laws, c. 99, s 45, p. 233 (1849-1850).
  5. Colorado (Terr.)-Colo.Gen.Laws of Terr. of Colo., 1st Sess., s 42, pp.
  296-297 (1861).
  6. Connecticut-Conn.Stat. Tit. 20, ss 14, 16 (1821). By 1868, this statute



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  44
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *177,  93 S.Ct. 705, **739)
  had been replaced by another abortion law. Conn.Pub.Acts, c. 71, ss 1, 2,
  p. 65 (1860).
  7. Florida-Fla.Acts 1st Sess., c. 1637, subs. 3, ss 10, 11, subc. 8, ss 9,
  10, 11 (1868), as amended, now Fla.Stat.Ann. ss 782.09, 782.10, 797.01,
  797.02, 782.16 (1965).
  8. Georgia-Ga.Pen.Code, 4th Div., s 20 (1833).
  9. Kingdom of Hawaii-Hawaii Pen.Code, c. 12, ss 1, 2, 3 (1850).
  10. Idaho (Terr.)-Idaho (Terr.) Laws, Crimes and Punishments ss 33, 34, 42,
  pp. 441, 443 (1863).
  11. Illinois-Ill.Rev. Criminal Code ss 40, 41, 46, pp. 130, 131 (1827). By
  1868, this statute had been replaced by a subsequent enactment.
  Ill.Pub.Laws ss 1, 2, 3, p. 89 (1867).
  12. Indiana-Ind.Rev.Stat. ss 1, 3, p. 224 (1838). By 1868 this statute had
  been superseded by a subsequent enactment. Ind.Laws, c. LXXXI, s 2 (1859).
  13. Iowa (Terr.)-Iowa (Terr.) Stat. 1st Legis., 1st Sess., s 18, p. 145
  (1838). By 1868, this statute had been superseded by a subsequent
  enactment. Iowa (Terr.) Rev.Stat., c. 49, ss 10, 13 (1843).
  14. Kansas (Terr.)-Kan. (Terr.) Stat., c. 48, ss 9, 10, 39 (1855). By 1868,
  this statute had been superseded by a subsequent enactment. Kan. (Terr.)
  Laws, c. 28, ss 9, 10, 37 (1859).
  15. Louisiana-La.Rev.Stat., Crimes and Offenses s 24, p. 138 (1856).
  16. Maine-Me.Rev.Stat., c. 160, ss 11, 12, 13, 14 (1840).
  17. Maryland-Md.Laws, c. 179, s 2, p. 315 (1868).
  18. Massachusetts-Mass.Acts & Resolves, c. 27 (1845).
  19. Michigan-Mich.Rev.Stat., c. 153, ss 32, 33, 34, p. 662 (1846).
  20. Minnesota (Terr.)-Minn. (Terr.) Rev.Stat., c. 100, ss 10, 11, p. 493
  (1851).
  21. Mississippi-Miss.Code, c. 64, ss 8, 9, p. 958 (1848).
  22. Missouri-Mo.Rev.Stat., Art. II, ss 9, 10, 36, pp. 168, 172 (1835).
  23. Montana (Terr.)-Mont. (Terr.) Laws, Criminal Practice Acts s 41, p.
  184 (1864).
  24. Nevada (Terr.)-Nev. (Terr.) Laws, c. 28, s 42, p. 63 (1861).
  25. New Hampshire-N.H.Laws, c. 743, s 1, p. 708 (1848).
  26. New Jersey-N.J.Laws, p. 266 (1849).
  27. New York-N.Y.Rev.Stat., pt. 4, c. 1, Tit. 2, ss 8, 9, pp. 12-13 (1828).
  By 1868, this statute had been superseded. N.Y.Laws, c. 260, ss 1, 2, 3, 4,
  5, 6, pp. 285-286 (1845); N.Y.Laws, c. 22, s 1, p. 19 (1846).
  28. Ohio-Ohio Gen.Stat. ss 111(1), 112(2), p. 252 (1841).
  29. Oregon-Ore.Gen.Laws, Crim.Code, c. 43, s 509, p. 528 (1845-1964).
  30. Pennsylvania-Pa.Laws No. 374 ss 87, 88, 89 (1860).
  31. Texas-Tex.Gen.Stat.Dig., c. VII, Arts. 531-536, p. 524 (Oldham & White
  1859).
  32. Vermont-Vt.Acts No. 33, s 1 (1846). By 1868, this statute had been
  amended. Vt.Acts No. 57, ss 1, 3 (1867).
  33. Virginia-Va.Acts, Tit. II, c. 3, s 9, p. 96 (1848).
  34. Washington (Terr.)-Wash. (Terr.) Stats., c. II, ss 37, 38, p. 81
  (1854).
  35. West Virginia-Va.Acts, Tit. II, c. 3, s 9, p. 96 (1848).
  36. Wisconsin-Wis.Rev.Stat., c. 133, ss 10, 11 (1849). By 1868, this
  statute had been superseded. Wis.Rev.Stat., c. 164, ss 10, 11; c. 169, ss



  93 S.Ct. 705 PAGE  45
(Cite as: 410 U.S. 113, *177,  93 S.Ct. 705, **739)
  58, 59 (1858).

FN2. Abortion laws in effect in 1868 and still applicable as of August
  1970:
  1. Arizona (1865).
  2. Connecticut (1860).
  3. Florida (1868).
  4. Idaho (1863).
  5. Indiana (1838).
  6. Iowa (1843).
  7. Maine (1840).
  8. Massachusetts (1845).
  9. Michigan (1846).
  10. Minnesota (1851).
  11. Missouri (1835).
  12. Montana (1864).
  13. Nevada (1861).
  14. New Hampshire (1848).
  15. New Jersey (1849).
  16. Ohio (1841).
  17. Pennsylvania (1860).
  18. Texas (1859).
  19. Vermont (1867).
  20. West Virginia (1848).
  21. Wisconsin (1858).

  There apparently was no question concerning the validity of this provision or
 of any of the other state statutes when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
 The only conclusion possible from this history is that the drafters did not
 intend to have the Fourteenth Amendment withdraw from the States the power to
 legislate with respect to this matter.
III
  Even if one were to agree that the case that the Court decides were here, and
 that the enunciation of the substantive constitutional law in the Court's
 opinion were proper, the actual disposition of the case by the Court is still
 difficult to justify. The Texas statute is struck down in toto, even though the
 Court apparently concedes that at later periods of pregnancy Texas might impose
 these selfsame statutory limitations on abortion. My understanding of past
 practice is that a statute found *178 to be invalid as applied to a
 particular plaintiff, but not unconstitutional as a whole, is not simply
 'struck down' but is, instead, declared unconstitutional as applied to the fact
 situation before the Court. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30
 L.Ed. 220 (1886); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 89 S.Ct. 1354, 22 L.Ed.
 572 (1969).
  For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.